“He spoke Yiddish like a Jew”: Neighbors’ Contribution to the Mass Killing of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, July 1941

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The mass murder of Jews by the local population during Operation Barbarossa was as common in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia as in eastern Poland, Lithuania, or Galicia. Residents in many localities in these areas seized the “window of opportunity” between the flight of the Soviet administration and the arrival of Romanian or German forces to murder Jews on their own initiative. Plundering was a key component of the pogroms that took place everywhere. The following illustrates the need for further consideration of the chronology and contexts of pogroms at the beginning of the war in the East.

Introduction
On July 2, 1941, the German Eleventh Army and allied Romanian troops launched offensive combat operations on the Southern Front (Operation München) against the USSR, crossing from Romania into Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. In these areas, subsequently to be administered by Romania, massacres of Jews were carried out shortly before as well as during the first few days of the offensive. Most massacres were carried out by Romanian soldiers and gendarmes. German troops and members of Einsatzgruppe D took part in some. Elsewhere, the local Romanian or Ukrainian population either participated in the murders or initiated pogroms on their own, often before the arrival of Romanian troops. An estimated 43,500 to 60,000 Jews were killed in this first wave of violence.

We can identify three groups of perpetrators in the mass murder of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in early July 1941. The first, the Romanian army, was responsible for many massacres. In Northern Bukovina and northern Bessarabia primarily Romanian—not German—units carried out the first wave of attacks on Jewish civilians, having met with little or no resistance by the withdrawing Red Army. As early as July 5, the Romanian General Staff noted in the summary of the day’s operations in Northern Bukovina that enemy resistance had been broken. It was almost always Romanian soldiers, some in what were essentially execution squads, who first encountered the local Jewish population. The widespread murders of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia was a deliberate policy planned in advance (if not in detail).
by the political and military leadership. The goal was to ethnically “cleanse” the re-conquered areas. But mass murder was possible only after the Soviet order had collapsed and the perpetrators in the field—the army and gendarmerie—had gained access to the defenseless Jewish population. There was a close relationship between the war itself and the extermination of the Jews. While orders from Bucharest and from field commanders did indeed exist, there were generally redundant because the perpetrators on the scene “knew” what was required of them and appeared to believe their actions right and just. They seem to have felt it ideologically and politically “right” to kill, acting also because the war had made it possible to do so with impunity.

A second group of perpetrators included local residents who “assisted” the soldiers in their activities. Sometimes, when Romanian troops marched into small towns, shtetls, or villages and began “randomly” and unsystematically to shoot Jews in their homes or in the streets, local perpetrators joined in; elsewhere, locals began killing and looting, and were joined by soldiers, who then “took over.”

The third group of perpetrators—the main focus here—was the local population acting on its own. As we will see, in many places the Jews’ neighbors themselves exploited the power vacuum between the departure of one government and the arrival of the next to initiate pogroms. Omer Bartov has spoken fittingly of communal genocide, Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg of “intimate violence,” and Aristotle Kallis of “localized eliminationist violence.” To date, however, there has been no systematic examination of this phenomenon in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.

Historical research on Romania’s involvement in the war of extermination in the East and in the Holocaust remains modest. In 2007 Armin Heinen suggested that the state of Holocaust research in Romania was comparable to that of German historical research in the mid-1960s. While the Holocaust in Romanian-controlled Transnistria has received more attention in recent years, the mass murders carried out in the summer of 1941 have generally appeared as mere footnotes in both Romanian and international publications. One exception is the report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania. Though the report was compiled under considerable time pressure, it offered a commendable summary of the existing state of knowledge. While the report thus provided a starting point for further research, scarcely any mention of neighbors as perpetrators appeared in it.

Authors such as Dennis Deletant, Jean Ancel, Vladimir Solonari, Mihai Chioveanu, and Mariana Hausleitner have addressed the massacres of summer 1941 in brief passages, chapters in general studies, and articles in scholarly journals. Armin Heinen dedicates several sections of his study Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt to the first phase of the Holocaust in Romania. An older but nonetheless valuable study by Avigdor Shachan examines massacres in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Shachan’s work is among the few to present accounts by surviving victims. Finally, Radu Ioanid dedicated an entire chapter of The Holocaust in...
Romania to massacres carried out at the beginning of the Romanian-German offensive. Still, the local perpetrators themselves have received only modest scholarly attention. Jan T. Gross’s groundbreaking work on neighbors as perpetrators in Poland (of course preceded by lesser-known works) has yet to be replicated for Romania.

In light of recent research on the summer 1941 pogroms in Galicia and Poland, there is a need for a general examination of analogous actions in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. This article attempts a preliminary effort in this direction. It addresses two key issues. First, it seeks to determine when pogroms initiated by the local populations in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia took place, what happened, how the massacres were organized, and who the perpetrators were. Second, it tries to establish the motives of local perpetrators and collaborators, in particular how much freedom they had to act on their own.

My main sources are taped testimonies in the University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archives; written reports in Yad Vashem’s Record Group O.3; Jewish memorial (yizkor) books; and survivor memoirs. As Omer Bartov has argued, researchers should no longer ignore the testimonies of survivors; others agree that testimonies “do constitute documentation and proof,” contending that they should not be discounted for any alleged subjectivity or “unreliability.” Obviously we must read them critically and in the light of whatever other evidence may be available. But in many cases, survivors’ testimonies are the only evidentiary material available. I hope that in the future others will utilize accounts from Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia more systematically than I can here.

An important printed source is the collection of documents with extensive commentary compiled by Matatias Carp directly after the end of the war. Until 1989 Carp’s study remained “the only serious scholarly work on the Jewish Holocaust” ever published in Romania. Nearly all of the most important works dealing with the subject—the July massacres included—draw heavily upon it. Yet even before Carp’s work appeared in 1947, the journalist Marius Miru published a book focusing on the pogroms in Northern Bukovina and in the adjacent county of Dorohoi in Romanian Moldavia. Miru’s work, however, did not have nearly the impact of Carp’s Black Book. Nevertheless, Miru’s book contains important information that fills in gaps in the latter.

I have also evaluated selected materials from four collections at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington, DC. The first of these was the archives of the Romanian Ministry of Defense (RG-25.003M), containing information on the military’s operations in early July 1941. Of greater importance were the three other collections, which provide information on the massacres (RG-25.004M, Romanian Information Services [Bucharest Records], 1936–1948; RG-54.001M, Selected Records from the National Archives of Moldova [Chişinău], 1941–1944; and RG-54.003, War Crimes Investigations and Trial Records from the Republic of Moldova, 1944–1955). These collections include documentation from
trials during which survivors were interviewed as witnesses, as well as files of the Soviet Union’s Extraordinary State Commission (which initiated documentation of the crimes of the fascists immediately upon the latter’s departure).

The following section embraces roughly the first ten days of July 1941. The sources illuminate events in individual towns, shtetls, and villages where massacres of Jews were initiated and carried out by the local population or in which the latter participated in some fashion. I seek to describe the beginnings and course of the pogroms. In a separate section I delve into participants’ motives. The conclusion considers this work as a starting point for further research.

**Neighbors as Perpetrators**

On July 2, 1941, the first Romanian and German troops on the Southern Front crossed into Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the fourth day of the invasion, the Romanian General Staff believed that all resistance in Northern Bukovina and the northern part of Bessarabia had been broken. That this rapid advance had encountered only scattered pockets of resistance—unlike that in central and southern Bessarabia—reflected the fact that Soviet troops had withdrawn from the border regions of Northern Bukovina and northern Bessarabia prior to July 2.

On July 3, troops of the Romanian 16th Infantry Battalion entered the town of Ciudei, only a few kilometers north of what had been the border between Romania and the USSR (today the border between Romania and Ukraine). At least one Jewish resident of Ciudei warned the town’s Jews: “It’s not good . . . to stay here, because the [Romanian army] and the German army are coming in. They’ll be blood-thirsty and we are the first Jewish people here.” But nearly all of Ciudei’s Jews ignored these warnings, and those who did not flee in time experienced occupation by Romanian troops. At first the Jews believed they were safe, but armed bands of locals soon began to plunder the area: “We saw many young people, Gentiles, running with pitchforks . . . sticks to hit with, and sacks on their shoulders to rob, and when they saw us going in the opposite direction, they said ‘You’re running away, we’ll find you there too.’” Later, nearly all of Ciudei’s Jews—more than 500 people—were herded together and shot by Romanian soldiers under Maj. Valeriu Carp. Local residents were not directly involved in the executions, but they beat and stole from the Jews, handed them over to the soldiers, and helped search for fugitives.

Storojineț (Storozhynets) was the first larger town in Northern Bukovina to be captured, and here, too, the troops began massacring Jews immediately after they occupied the town on July 4. The soldiers moved through the streets—at times accompanied by local farmers from the surrounding area, according to statements made by eyewitnesses—humiliating and attacking Jews, and shooting 200 men, women, and children. Soldiers, farmers, and many of the town’s Gentile residents plundered Jewish homes. As in Ciudei, locals played a secondary role in the massacres.
In Staneștii de Jos, a village east of Czernowitz, local perpetrators initiated a pogrom before the arrival of the troops.31 These locals organized a “Ukrainian national committee” to take control of the village, “arresting” the Jews and holding them in the mayor’s office or the saw-mill. The Ukrainian nationalists soon began to murder their prisoners, and when the Romanian army reached Staneștii de Jos, the pogrom was intensified. Upon its own arrival, the Romanian gendarmerie’s commander put a stop to the bloodbath, but by that time between eighty and 130 Jews had already been killed. The fact that a local gendarmerie commander could stop a massacre underscores the fact that the impetus for pogroms often came from below, and that the scope of action for the Romanian military and gendarmerie in the field was considerable.

The statement by survivor Nathan Snyder largely conforms to Vladimir Solonari’s findings regarding the massacre in Staneștii de Jos.32 Snyder described how the power vacuum following Soviet withdrawal was quickly filled by a Ukrainian “militia.” The Jews barricaded themselves in their houses, and the Ukrainians “patrolled”—usually armed with agricultural tools, for firearms were not widely available. The Ukrainians then decided to “fetch” the Jews from their homes and concentrate them in one place. A list was compiled from which the names of the Jewish men were read out one by one, after which these were led away. Snyder’s mother quickly realized where things were headed. She hid her son, saving him from certain death. Most of the Jewish men were beaten to death—only a few were shot. According to Snyder, it was the Romanians who put an end to the massacre.

Chana Wiesenfeld, who was also from Staneștii de Jos, related how Ukrainian neighbors rampaged through the village, armed with hammers and sickles.33 According to Wiesenfeld, more than 80 Jews were killed in the pogrom. Close to the village, local perpetrators killed a pregnant woman and beheaded her.

A series of similar massacres took place in towns and villages in Northern Bukovina, all of them after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and before the arrival of the Romanian. Below I provide a short description of events in Banila/Siret, Vînița (Vyzhnytsia), Banila/Ceremuş, Milie, Sadagura, Nepolocăuți (Nepolokivtsi), Kitsman, Kyseliv, and Boian. This, of course, represents only a selection of the places where massacres occurred, for pogroms broke out all over Northern Bukovina. Many villages had only a handful of Jewish residents, so usually no Jewish eyewitnesses survived.

In Banila/Siret a group of Romanians led by the town’s mayor killed fifteen Jews, including children and the elderly. Radu Ioanid described this as “[o]ne of the most horrible massacres” to take place in Northern Bukovina that July.34 The body of one of the victims was allegedly hacked to pieces and the blood used to “lubricate” wagon axles. According to Carp, the slaughter was so brutal that the local priest refused to hold church services the day after the massacre, a Sunday.35 The available sources do not record the context and reasons for the outbreak of the pogroms.
Romanian troops reached the Ceremuş River near the eastern border of Northern Bukovina on July 5 or 6. Twenty-one Jews were murdered in nearby Vîniţa, and, according to Mircu, the pogrom took place before the arrival of the army. A shohet (kosher slaughterer) in the shtetl was tied to a wooden sawhorse and cut into pieces with a saw while still alive. In Banila on the Ceremuş, between Vîniţa and Vâscăuți (Vashkivtsi), a mob of Ukrainian farmers drove a group into the Jewish cemetery and murdered more than 170. Other Jews had already been beaten to death in their houses. In Milie around 175 were murdered by villagers. Yisrael Minster, in Milie immediately afterwards, stated that he encountered not a single living Jew in the village.

In Sadagura, now a suburb of Czernowitz, locals began murdering Jews before the Romanian military arrived on July 5/6. The survivor Clara Blum, whose statements are preserved in the files of the Romanian postwar secret service, recounted how the perpetrators, led by one Vladimir Rusu, went from house to house robbing and murdering. Another source also spoke of the events in Sadagura but states that the massacre took place a day later: “On the early morning of July 7, 1941, eighty-six Jews were pulled from their beds—men, women, and children—and led half-naked to the town hall. From there, under cover of darkness, they were taken to a forest on a nearby hill, stood next to previously dug pits, and all of them shot. Seventy-three of them were killed. Present at the slaughter were fifty Rumanians and Ukrainians from among the residents of Sadagura.”

North of the Prut River the massacres began in most cases around July 6. As Solonari showed in his study based on the files of the Soviet Union’s Extraordinary State Commission, local perpetrators in Nepolocăuți launched the pogrom before the arrival of Romanian troops. Two Ukrainian farmers organized a group of villagers who then proceeded to break into and rob Jewish households. A few Jews were dragged to the bridge over the Ceremuş where they were attacked with pitchforks and thrown into the water. The Romanian army arrived on the following day, and the pogrom continued. Approximately forty Jews were murdered in Nepolocăuți.

Approximately 150 Jews were massacred in the village of Kyseliv, located in the northwestern tip of Northern Bukovina, on July 7. Spurred on by Ukrainian nationalists and drawn by the prospect of their Jewish neighbors’ (modest) wealth and property, the villagers of Kyseliv rounded them up and set about murdering them. As the murderers were inept with their “handiwork,” a few of the victims—covered with blood from the ordeal—were able to flee to the neighboring woods, and lived to tell of their experiences.

The village of Boian, approximately ten kilometers east of Czernowitz, also was the site of a pogrom initiated by civilians, followed by a mass shooting organized by soldiers. Shalom Eitan recalled, “My father spread the warning to the Jews in the village but they refused to take him seriously. Their claim was reasonable; they had lived in the village for generations, knew everyone and lived beside their neighbors.
with honor and friendship.” In Boian the perpetrators’ most important motives appear to have been both the prospect of economic gain and the almost ritual “expulsion” of the Jews as the epitome of the Other:

We hid in the attic . . . and ‘defended’ ourselves by piling some objects against the door leading to it. At nightfall the pogrom began, intensified once the light totally faded, and continued until almost dawn. Using various methods, the Gentiles murdered almost all of the Jews. Through a crack in the attic wall we saw them dragging the rabbi with the pitchfork stuck into his back. Beneath us, they broke into and ransacked all of our apartments. Beside our house, they burned the books and the scrolls of the Torah which they took from the synagogue. They were tired of stealing and [were] drinking themselves into drunkenness, dancing, and singing.44

Such massacres were by no means restricted to Northern Bukovina, for similar incidents also took place in Bessarabia. Here I wish to concentrate on several incidents that occurred in the northern part of the province. By July 6, 1941, the first Romanian troops had already reached Khotyn.45 A group of around fifty Jews, including the shtetl’s rabbi, were shot on July 10. According to the testimony of Jacob Twersky, the rabbi’s son, before the Bucharest people’s tribunal on June 19, 1945, a number of local citizens, policemen, and Romanian soldiers cooperated in preparing the massacre, though the Jews were actually shot by soldiers.46

In Secureni, located in the eastern-most part of the Khotyn district, a pogrom involving Romanian soldiers as well as members of the local population began only a few hours after the invasion. The tasks were “divided up”: the farmers went from house to house and plundered the Jews’ belongings, while the soldiers—on orders—went from house to house raping Jewish women and girls. Eighty Jews were murdered.47 Survivors later confirmed the looting as well as the rapes.48

As northern Bessarabia’s largest city, Bălți was of strategic importance to German and Romanian forces. Many Jews attempted to escape Bălți, enabling a number of massacres such as the one that occurred in the village of Vlad, where local farmers attacked, robbed, and killed a group of Jews fleeing the city.49 In Edineți, local perpetrators worked closely with Romanian soldiers. The Jews’ neighbors from all ethnic groups are said to have participated in the plundering, rape, and shootings: “One who excelled in these murders was Elyashe, the electrical engineer, who had worked all his life in the shtetl, for Jews, and spoke Yiddish like a Jew.”50 In Cepeleuți, twenty kilometers north of Edineți, local perpetrators—many of them probably Iron Guardists—tortured and killed Jews.51 In Catranic, near Fâlești, the local population killed the only Jewish family in the village.52

The story of collaboration has been “minimized as far as possible”53 in public discourse in many countries of Eastern Europe. Even some scholars maintain that the large majority of the local population in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia was apathetic, indifferent, and passive.54 Yet the sources tell another story. Local collaborators who were prepared to identify Jewish homes, shops, or people, betray Jews’ hiding
places, or arrest Jews in order to deliver them to the perpetrators, were to be found everywhere. The collaborators were the willing facilitators of the murder of Jews, and they usually benefited from the crime.

Without the support of local collaborators the Romanian army would not have been able to conduct mass executions in such a short time. In certain villages and shtetls there were Jews who were clearly and immediately recognizable as such due to their clothing and appearance, and this of course made them an easy target for Romanian soldiers. Furthermore, unlike the soldiers of the German Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union, Romanian soldiers were usually well acquainted with the areas they occupied. Many had served in these provinces up until the Soviet annexation in summer 1940. Romanian was spoken widely in Bessarabia, and it was also quite common in Northern Bukovina. Thus the Romanian soldiers met with hardly any language difficulties. Still, in these areas many Jews were largely assimilated into the local community, and could be identified only by their neighbors.

As the following examples show, murderous Romanian troops clearly depended on local support.

Romanian troops reached the small town of Herța (Hertsa) on July 4–5. Some of the local Jews even turned out to welcome them, but the Romanians immediately began to abuse the Jews they encountered. The commanding officer named a new mayor and organized a “militia,” whose first task was to compile lists so that Herța’s Jews could be arrested. A number of Jewish women and girls were “selected” and raped by Romanian soldiers. Jewish apartments and houses were plundered, and around 150 Jews were shot by execution squads. By compiling the lists, local collaborators contributed significantly to the massacre, and they profited greatly from the plunder.

In Edineț, neither the German and Romanian soldiers nor the Romanian gendarmes could readily identify the town’s Jewish residents. Here, too, it was local collaborators “who led the murderers to the Jewish houses.” In Kitsman, in Northern Bukovina, a Ukrainian lawyer was said to have handed to Romanian troops a list of the town’s Jews that he had compiled.

It was almost always local collaborators who betrayed Jews’ escape routes or hiding places. In Gordinești (Bessarabia), for example, a local collaborator captured two Jews and brought them to the Romanian soldiers, who subsequently shot the pair. In Costești (Kostyntsi, Northern Bukovina), the Romanian and Ukrainian villagers drove around 400 Jews into a field close to the village, where they were shot by Romanian forces. The Romanian villagers in Boian betrayed the hiding places of their Jewish neighbors to the Romanian soldiers.

In the village of Tețcani between Lipcani and Edineț on the Prut River, a local Ukrainian collaborator, the chief of the gendarmerie, and members of the local Iron Guard took part in the plundering of Jewish homes as well as those belonging to the
mothers and wives of Red Army soldiers. A number of Jews were beaten. The village’s Jewish families were captured and later deported to Transnistria.\textsuperscript{62}

In most cases the non-Jewish villagers were witnesses to Jews being torn from their homes, beaten, tortured, and killed. In most such cases, local residents knew who the perpetrators and collaborators were. There were no noteworthy instances of resistance to the mass murder of Jews on the part of the local population.\textsuperscript{63} Even those neighbors who were neither perpetrators nor collaborators stood to benefit economically from the murders.

**The Motives of the Neighbors**

There are limits to what we can reconstruct of the motives of the perpetrators of the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{64} What is certain, however, is that the motives were complex,\textsuperscript{65} and that it is impossible to come up with a general or monocausal explanation for what occurred.\textsuperscript{66} Indeed, the massacres of Jews by the local population sometimes seem “especially puzzling [because] the perpetrators are civilians and the victims are their neighbors.”\textsuperscript{67} Any attempt to determine why the perpetrators acted as they did or how much freedom they had to do so or to refrain is difficult indeed, for relatively few primary sources shed light on the issue. Grassroots perpetrators rarely left accounts of their behavior or motivations. Nevertheless, it is possible to work out general patterns of motives and mentalities that could have influenced the perpetrators’ decisions and actions, and to judge their relative importance.

Economic motives played a key role in the mass murders in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia—as elsewhere—and this is true for all groups of perpetrators. Many villagers and other neighbors saw nothing reprehensible in simply taking the land,
houses, or personal items of the murdered or deported Jews. For them, robbery and murder often went hand in hand. In his examination of events in Poland, Andrzej Zbikowski wrote, “First and foremost the Jews were robbed, everywhere and in great numbers. Later, when it became clear that it was possible to murder with impunity, people murdered so that no one would be there to remember the stolen property.”

The same is true of the regions examined here. Plundering took place everywhere and was a key component of all pogroms. In Ciudei plundering took place on a massive scale: “The windows were gone! The doors were gone! The bricks were missing.” Dora Nadler told of how the Romanian neighbors not only “took over” her parents’ house in the Bessarabian town of Râșcani after the family’s failed attempt to flee, but also of how they immediately put on the clothes they had stolen. In Lipcani after the Soviet withdrawal the local population “vacuumed up” Jewish property. In Soroca, neighbors not only occupied Raisa Zalman’s parental home and stole all the furniture, but even took the family portraits. The Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 67 from August 29, 1941 conveyed events on the Southern Front as follows: “Behavior of the Romanians: In general [there is] no town that has not been looted, robbed, ruined, and defiled.” These acts of plunder were often not the work of Romanian soldiers alone, but of mixed groups of perpetrators or sometimes exclusively of the local populace.

Ideological or political motives doubtlessly played a role for many, and these often heavily influenced events. In light of outbreaks of antisemitic violence in Romania during almost the entire interwar period, the antisemitic and nationalist indoctrination espoused and openly promoted by the state, political parties, politicians, the Orthodox Church, and the intelligentsia, it is impossible to maintain that the antisemitic attitudes of many planners of the Holocaust and—most important—perpetrators in the field did not play a role: “Such [antisemitic] propaganda was drilled into the heads of the Romanian public for many years, with the resulting popular belief that the only way for Romania to achieve a bright future would be to eliminate the Jewish element.”

Nationalist and antisemitic propaganda delegitimizing and dehumanizing the Jews clearly added to the “long-term cultural and psychological preparation” of violence against the Jews. Many of the victims told of the Romanian perpetrators’ fervid antisemitism. Diana Dumitru and Carter Johnson found that “the Gentile Bessarabian attitude was decidedly negative toward their Jewish neighbors.” Jean Ancel concluded that the mass murder of the Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia was nothing more than “the last stage of a long process of antisemitic policy development.”

This antisemitism was only intensified by the persuasive myth of “Jewish treachery” following Romania’s summer 1940 cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR, one of the results of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Jews were made scapegoats for that disaster, justifying their robbery, expulsion, or murder in 1941;
thus, before the war had even broken out, the Jews had been cast as a sworn enemy
who had to be eradicated. Antisemitism permeated the ranks of the Romanian army,
which “thirsted for revenge against the Jews.”

The forces that drove the Romanian perpetrators included antisemitism, anticommunism (or rather anti-Russi-2
anism), brutality, and sadism. No wonder that many Jewish victims—like Yehuda Kafri in
Edineți—believed the Romanian perpetrators killed with “Satanic pleasure.”

In the case of local Ukrainian perpetrators, particularly those in Northern Bukovina, economic motives appear to have played a key role as well. Frequently,
however, this group was driven in addition by a specific political motive. Many
Ukrainians hoped that Operation Barbarossa would mean autonomy, independence,
and statehood for an ethnically homogeneous Ukraine at the expense of Russia and
Poland. In their view, Jews—like Poles and Russians—stood in the way of this
dream. A survivor from Lujeni near Czernowitz told of marauding bands of Ukrainian
farmers who robbed and murdered Jews while screaming, “Now we will have a free
Ukraine!” Parts of the Ukrainian population believed the Jews were the Russians’
helpers—that they had benefited from Soviet rule and were responsible for killings
by the Soviet secret service, the NKVD, during the Soviet withdrawal.

The pogroms also represented a form of ritual that the local perpetrators
believed would help bring about “pure” Romanian or Ukrainian rule by removing the
“foreign elements.” The Jews stood for this foreign element and were “easy” victims
because they were generally entirely defenseless.

Antisemitic radicalization could no longer be controlled after the war had
begun, and, in any case, there was no one—either in the political or military leader-
ship—who would have been willing even to try to stop the massacres. The onset of
war removed the final inhibitions. Some authors have suggested that local perpetrators
and collaborators were usually individuals on the social margins who were acting out
their own frustrations. This inclination to attribute collaboration to marginal groups,
however, falls far short of adequacy. In Banila/Siret, for example, the town mayor or-
ganized the pogrom. A lawyer was responsible for drawing up the list of Jews to be
killed in Kitsman. In the case of the Lviv pogrom, John-Paul Himka has shown that it
was by no means exclusively petty criminals and marginalized individuals who collabor-
ated or even murdered; on the contrary, “heterogeneous social elements” took part.

Scholars have debated whether local pogroms were incited by outside actors.
The Romanian secret service did indeed issue instructions to “create” a hostile envi-
ronment for the Jews. A written plan—following up on oral orders given on July 8,
1941—was presented to the mobile section of the General Headquarters close to the
frontlines on July 11, 1941. However, this plan covered only central and southern
Bessarabia. Furthermore, the first wave of pogroms in Northern Bukovina and the
northern part of Bessarabia was already abating when this plan was issued to the com-
manders in the field. Diana Dumitru has argued that we “will probably not be able to
find a definitive answer” to the question of whether the pogroms were “caused by Romanian provocateurs” or were “spontaneous.” In fact, it is unnecessary to create a dichotomy: many local pogroms in summer 1941 in Northern Bukovina and in Bessarabia were “spontaneous,” but that does not exclude the possibility that some were incited and facilitated by outside actors.

Conclusion

The idea that Germans were the only perpetrators of the Holocaust—a notion that dominated public perception and even research for many years—has long since been proven false. The naming of other perpetrators is certainly not intended to relativize Germany’s responsibility. It merely takes into account the fact that non-Germans were involved. It is particularly remarkable that so little research has been carried out into the role of Romanian perpetrators, for Romania not only offered the largest number of troops of all of Germany’s allies in the Eastern Campaign, but also had the capacities as well as the will to implement a comprehensive strategy of eliminating Jews, taking part in the Holocaust actively and independently.

The subject of local perpetrators during the first phase of the Holocaust in the East became a new focus of research after Jan T. Gross elucidated the issue in his book on the Polish town of Jedwabne. Even earlier, other authors had pointed out that a wave of pogroms took place in the borderlands on the eve of or during Operation Barbarossa—that is to say, before the Einsatzgruppen even deployed. More recent studies by authors such as Sara Bender, Alexander V. Prusin, John-Paul Himka, Wendy Lower, and Kai Struve have shed light on actions of locals in summer 1941 in what is now Western Ukraine. To my knowledge, however, there has never been a systematic examination of events in Romanian-controlled areas based on the testimonies of survivors and seeking to determine how and under what conditions local perpetrators plundered or murdered their Jewish neighbors.

In the foregoing I have attempted to contribute to filling this gap. Innovative approaches (comparative perspectives, oral history, or the history of mentalities) could provide useful tools for further research. Micro-studies of single towns or shtetls could help. Such contributions would enhance our overall understanding of the dynamic of mass murder in the East in summer 1941. In particular, the files of the USHMM contain a wealth of untapped documentation.

The present cursory analysis of the massacres of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in early July 1941 shows that the local population in many villages, shtetls, and towns took advantage of the “void without any authority, norm, or sanction” that arose between the withdrawal of the Red Army and the arrival of the Romanian and German troops to undertake pogroms on their own. It shows that the waves of violence by the local population around Operation Barbarossa were by no means limited to Lithuania, eastern Poland, and Galicia, but were widespread in other places as well. A more in-depth comparative examination of massacres in various regions could prove...
fruitful. Open topics requiring further research on Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia include the possible involvement of the Romanian secret service and the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in facilitating some of the pogroms.

Although Jean Ancel maintained that “[virtually] anyone who was armed took part in the slaughter,” in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia it is likely that only a minority of the villagers took direct part. Yet when we examine the massacres in their entirety, it becomes clear that the local Romanian and, often, Ukrainian populations played “a very active role in the murders and torture during the first days of the occupation.” In Romanian-controlled territories, the murders of Jews were by no means “standardized and steered from ‘above.’” Local perpetrators “put their own stamp on the war of extermination,” and the fundamental impulse behind the massacres often came “from below,” from soldiers in the field and from the Jews’ own neighbors.

The evidence presented here largely confirms the thesis proposed by both Vladimir Solonari and Jean Ancel that ethnic Ukrainians were widely involved in the massacres in Northern Bukovina—for example in the pogroms in Staneștii de Jos, Banila/Ceremus, Nepolocânti, and Kyseliv—while ethnic Romanians, some of them Iron Guardists, played a larger role in Bessarabia. However, there were also instances of close cooperation between Romanians, Ukrainians, and others in killing Jews—for example in Sadagura, Tețcani, and Edineț. For reasons yet to be explained, the massacres in Northern Bukovina tended to be more violent than those in Bessarabia.

From the victims’ point of view, being attacked by the local population had a shocking quality of its own. These perpetrators were not uniformed security forces with whom the victims had no relationship: they were their neighbors—like Elyashe in Edineț, who had worked all his life in the shtetl and spoke fluent Yiddish. These neighbors were not ordered to kill Jews—they wanted to. The disappearance of neighborliness—of a relationship that if sometimes tense, was, according to many Jews, often harmonious and structured around mutual (economic) dependence—came as a betrayal.

The largely risk-free opportunity to enrich themselves by plundering the Jews—viewed by some as hated competitors and “foreigners” with a different religion, look, and language—and deeply-rooted antisemitic and nationalistic attitudes seem to have been the most important driving factors behind many people’s will to initiate or participate in pogroms. Few seem to have hesitated. Almost nobody opposed them.

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Notes
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1. Operation München did not start on June 22, 1941, as is sometimes assumed, but on July 2.
2. See Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1965), 504; note in the Kriegstagebuch of the Heeresgruppe Süd (II. Teil, Band 1), Bundesarchiv Freiburg/Breisgau, RH/19/I (71).

2. Vladimir Solonari, “Patterns of Violence: Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no. 4 (2007): 756: “It was the Romanian Army and gendarmerie who played the decisive role in the mass killing of Jews in these two provinces.”


5. Daily report of General Staff (dated July 5, 1941), Archives of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), RG-25.003M, reel 1; and Heeresgruppe Süd, Tagesmeldungen, Bundesarchiv Freiburg, RH/19/I (76). In the middle and southern sections of the front (Bessarabia) the situation differed: there, Soviet forces proved stronger and more dedicated, requiring German troops to be more involved in the fighting than in Northern Bukovina or the northern portion of Bessarabia.


9. By Yehuda Bauer’s definition, a shtetl “was a township with 1,000 to 15,000 Jews, who formed at least a third of the total population [whose] life was regulated by the Jewish calendar and by customs derived from a traditional interpretation of the Jewish religion”; The Death of the Shtetl (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 3.


16. I generally use the Romanian spellings of place names, but have excepted Czernowitz because its elites spoke primarily German before the war.


27. Carp, Cartea Neagra, 338; Mircu, Pogromurile, 24ff.

28. USC Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archive (VHA), Hildia Frenkel interview (no. 14356).


30. Ioanid, Holocaust, 97–98.

31. Solonari, “Patterns of Violence.”

32. VHA, Nathan Snyder interview (no. 35725).

33. VHA, Chana Wiesenfeld interview (no. 15665).

34. Ioanid, Holocaust, 98.

35. Carp, Cartea Neagra, 339.

37. Yad Vashem, O.3, Yisrael Minster Collection, file 10272, item 3564801; Ioanid, Holocaust, 98.
38. VHA, Anna Schlimper interview (no. 43412).
39. Mircu, Pogromurile, 46; Yisrael Minster, ibid.
42. Solonari, “Patterns of Violence.”
45. Bundesarchiv Freiburg/Breisgau, RH/19/I (76), Heeresgruppe Süd, Tagesmeldungen.
46. Testimony of Jacob Twersky before the Bucharest people’s tribunal on June 19, 1945, USHMM, RG-25.004M (Selected Records from the Romanian Information Service, 1936–1948), reel 23; Ioanid, Holocaust, 102.
47. Shachan, Burning Ice, 59.
48. VHA, Ben Tsion Flom interview (no. 49113); Yad Vashem, O.3, Israel Parikman Collection, file 1460, item 3555376.
51. Trial no. 019529 (Eni, Konstantin Ivanovich), 1944, USHMM, RG-54.003 (War Crimes Investigation and Trial Records from the Republic of Moldova, 1944–1955), box 2, #12.
52. Yad Vashem, O.3, Nesia Pil Collection, item 6970593.
55. Massacre of Jews in Herta, Court investigation, USHMM, RG-25.004M (Selected Records from the Romanian Information Service, 1936–1948), reel 23.

56. VHA, Charna Dakh interview (no. 38317).


59. Extraordinary State Investigation Commission, USHMM, RG-54.001M (Selected Records from the National Archives of Moldova, 1941–1944), reel 14.

60. Ioanid, Holocaust, 99.

61. VHA, Nora Weisman interview (no. 3420).

62. Trial no. 5580 (Bordeniuk, Dmitrii Minovich), 1948, USHMM, RG-54.003 (War Crimes Investigation and Trial Records from the Republic of Moldova, 1944–1955), box 1, #4.

63. Solonari, “Patterns of Violence,” 787.


66. See also Kallis, “‘Licence’ and Genocide.”


70. Eisig, Yizkor Book Ciuðin.

71. VHA, Dora Nadler interview (no. 19012).

72. VHA, Iosif Zukin interview (no. 50157).

73. Yad Vashem, O.3, Raisa Zalman, file 4828.


78. VHA, Michael Cernea interview (no. 48241); Fay Fryd interview (no. 43639); Leonid Brumberg interview (no. 26117).


82. Cited in Reicher and Magen-Shitz, *Memorial Book Yedintzi*.


84. Struve, “Rites of Violence?” 66.

85. Yad Vashem, O.3, Sara Gruenberg collection, file 1744, item 3739705.


88. Instructions for the Propaganda units; Instructions for the Services of propaganda and counter-propaganda in the Army, USHMM, RG-25.003 (Selected Records from the Romanian Ministry of Defense, 1940–1945), reel 11; see also Baum, Varianten, 500–01; Dumitru, “Atitudinea,” 40.


94. Solonari, “Patterns of Violence,” 786.

95. Shachan, *Burning Ice*, 68; see also Solonari, “Patterns of Violence.”

